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In a recent publication Peri Sarveswara Sharma (1994: 60) draws attention to a passage 
in Pårthasårathi Mißra's commentary Nyåyaratnåkara on Kumårila Bha††a's 
Ílokavårttika, where the former, so he claims, summarises the views of Praßastapåda, 
author of the Padårthadharmasa∫graha, better known as Praßastapådabhå∑ya. 
Pårthasårathi's passage occurs under verse 66 of the chapter called 
Sambandhåk∑epaparihåra, and reads as follows:1 
 
vaiße∑ikås tv åhu˙: anådir ayaµ s®∑†ipralayapravåha˙, bråhmamånena 
var∑aßatånte bhagavato maheßvarasya samastajagatsaµhårecchå bhavati, 
tadicchåvad¥ßvaråtmasaµyogåt paramåˆu∑u vibhågakarmåˆy utpadyante, taiß ca 
sarve∑u mitho vibhakte∑u yåvad dvyaˆukaµ sarvåvayavinåßåd paramåˆava eva 
kevalå˙ pårthivåpyataijasavåyav¥yå vyomakåladigåtmamanåµsi cåvati∑†hante, 
dharmådharmåß ca tåvantaµ kålam ¥ßvarecchåpratibaddhå˙ phalam 
aprayacchantas te∑u te∑v åtmasv avati∑†hante, punas tåvati kåle gate tasyaiva 
bhagavata˙ karmopabhogaßËnyån åtmano d®∑†vå anukampåparavaßasya sis®k∑å 
bhavati, tata˙ sis®k∑åvad¥ßvaråtmasaµyogåt paramåˆu∑u karmotpattes tadvaßån 
mitha˙ saµyuktais tair dvyaˆukådikrameˆa p®thivyådaya årabhyante, tatas 
tadicchåvaßåd evåpagatapratibandhair abhivyaktasåmarthyair vividhai˙ 
karmabhir vividhånekanarapaßvådibhedabhinnaµ bhËtajåtam årabhyate, tata˙ sa 
eva maheßvaro dharmådharmapratipådanåya vedån s®jati/ tad evaµ pratisargam 
anye 'nye ca vedå˙, pravåhatas tu vedå˙ s®∑†ipralayåß cånådaya˙, kartå ca 
maheßvaro 'nådir eva, iha ca paramåˆËnåm upådånatvån nånupådånatvaµ s®∑†er 
iti/ 
 
                                                
* I thank Gerdi Gerschheimer for help and advice. 
1 NyR 5.15.66, p. 465-66. 
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Pårthasårathi does not say that he here summarises the views of Praßastapåda. It is 
however true that the Padårthadharmasa∫graha contains a passage which in its contents 
is close to the above one. The relevant parts of it read:2 
 
ihedån¥µ caturˆåµ mahåbhËtånåµ s®∑†isaµhåravidhir ucyate/ bråhmeˆa månena 
var∑aßatånte ... maheßvarasya saµjih¥r∑åsamakålaµ 
ßar¥rendriyamahåbhËtopanibandhakånåµ sarvåtmagatånåm ad®∑†ånåµ 
v®ttinirodhe sati maheßvarecchåtmåˆusaµyogajakarmabhya˙ 
ßar¥rendriyakåraˆåˆuvibhågebhyas tatsaµyoganiv®ttau te∑åm åparamåˆvanto 
vinåßa˙/ tathå p®thivyudakajvalanapavanånåm api mahåbhËtånåm anenaiva 
krameˆottarasminn uttarasmin sati pËrvasya pËrvasya vinåßa˙/ tata˙ 
pravibhaktå˙ paramåˆavo 'vati∑†hante dharmådharmasaµskårånuviddhåß 
cåtmånas tåvantam eva kålam/ tata˙ puna˙ pråˆinåµ bhogabhËtaye 
maheßvarasis®k∑ånantaraµ sarvåtmagatav®ttilabdhåd®∑†åpek∑ebhyas 
tatsaµyogebhya˙ pavanaparamåˆu∑u karmotpattau te∑åµ 
parasparasaµyogebhyo dvyaˆukådiprakrameˆa mahån våyu˙ samutpann[a˙] 
etc. 
 
There can be no doubt that Pårthasårathi's account contains much that is also found in 
the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. It even looks as if Pårthasårathi misinterpreted a 
compound used by Praßastapåda. The latter's passage contains the ambiguous 
expression maheßvarecchåtmåˆusaµyogajakarmabhya˙. The part 
maheßvarecchåtmåˆusaµyoga means, according to the commentators: "the desire of 
God and contact (or: the contacts) between the souls and the atoms".3 The whole 
expression maheßvarecchåtmåˆusaµyogajakarma- must therefore mean: "movements 
arisen from the desire of God and contact between the souls and the atoms". 
Pårthasårathi's passage, on the other hand, has the phrase 
tadicchåvad¥ßvaråtmasaµyogåt paramåˆu∑u vibhågakarmåˆy utpadyante: "movements 
of separation arise in the atoms as a result of contact between God characterised by that 
desire on the one hand and the souls on the other". It is hard to imagine that such a 
position was ever held by a Vaiße∑ika. But it is conceivable that this position was 
ascribed to the Vaiße∑ikas as a result of a careless reading of the ambiguous expression 
maheßvarecchåtmåˆusaµyoga. Grammatically this could mean "contact between the 
                                                
2 WI p. 9-10 §§ 57-58. 
3 Vy I p. 98 l. 3-4: maheßvarecchå nimittakåraˆam, åtmanåm aˆubhi˙ saµyogaß ca asamavåyikåraˆam; 
Ki p. 62 l. 8: maheßvarecchayå sahitå ye åtmåˆusåµyogå˙; Ny p. 136 l. 9: maheßvarasyecchå 
cåtmåˆusaµyogåß ceti vigraha˙. 
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desire of God, the souls, and the atoms". As stated above, such an interpretation does 
not easily fit into Vaiße∑ika doctrine. 
 Do we have to conclude from all this that Pårthasårathi here summarises, i.e. 
reformulates in his own words, the passage from the Padårthadharmasa∫graha? Or did 
he have another source, which he perhaps quotes verbatim? It is to be observed that, in 
spite of the similarities, there are also some important differences between 
Pårthasårathi's passage and the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. It is known that the Vedåntin 
Ía∫kara was acquainted with a Vaiße∑ika account of the creation of the world different 
from that in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha, and which most probably belonged to the 
earlier, but now lost, Ka†and¥ of Råvaˆa.4 Is it possible that Pårthasårathi, too, used that 
text? 
 This possibility can be discarded. Råvaˆa's Ka†and¥ did, to be sure, contain an 
account of the creation of the world (and probably one of its destruction), but one in 
which there was no place for a creator God. Indeed, Ía∫kara critisises it for this very 
reason. Praßastapåda may have been the first Vaiße∑ika author to introduce the notion of 
a creator (and destroyer) God. 
 What about Praßastapåda's È¥kå on the Ka†and¥, which has not been preserved 
either? Is it possible that Pårthasårathi used a Vaiße∑ika account of the creation and 
destruction of the world which he found in that text? Are the elements recorded by 
Pårthasårathi that have no parallels in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha to be explained as 
borrowings from Praßastapåda's È¥kå? 
 We will see that this too is highly improbable. Pårthasårathi attributes to the 
Vaiße∑ikas an idea which they are unlikely to have held. It is the idea that God 
interrupts the workings of karmic retribution at the time of cosmic dissolution, and ends 
this interruption at the time of renewed creation. We will discuss this point below. 
 First we consider the following. Pårthasårathi's presentation of the alleged 
Vaiße∑ika position introduces a passage in the Ílokavårttika in which the notion of a 
creator God is criticised. It is therefore conceivable that it — or at least the parts that 
talk about God interrupting karmic retribution — has been composed to fit the verses of 
Kumårila's text. Soon after this account Pårthasårathi introduces a verse of the 
Ílokavårttika with the words: "Concerning what has been said to the extent that deeds 
do not bear fruit because they are interrupted by the desire of God, [Kumårila] says".5 
And after that same verse he resumes: "But there is no proof that all deeds, without 
giving result, have been interrupted by the mere desire of God."6 May we conclude that 
                                                
4 Bronkhorst, 1996. For information about the Ka†and¥, see Bronkhorst, 1993. 
5 NyR p. 466 l. 21: yat tËktam ¥ßvarecchåpratibaddhatvåt karmåˆi na phalant¥ti, tatråha. 
6 NyR p. 466 l. 24-25: sarvakarmaˆåµ tu phalam adadatåm ¥ßvarecchåmåtreˆa pratibaddhånåm 
avasthånam apramåˆakam iti. 
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already Kumårila ascribed to the Vaiße∑ikas the idea that God's mere desire interrupts 
the working of karma? 
 This is far from obvious. Kumårila does not mention God's desire, nor indeed 
anyone else's, in the context of the destruction of the world (which he does not accept). 
Quite on the contrary, he speaks of a deed (karman) of Prajåpati. The verses concerned 
read as follows:7 
 
pralaye 'pi pramåˆaµ na˙ sarvocchedåtmake na hi/ 
na ca prayojanaµ tena syåt prajåpatikarmaˆå //68// 
na ca karmavatåµ yuktå sthitis tadbhogavarjitå/ 
karmåntaraniruddhaµ hi phalaµ na syåt kriyåntaråt //69// 
sarve∑åµ tu phalåpetaµ na sthånam upapadyate/ 
na cåpy anupabhogo 'sau kasyacit karmaˆa˙ phalam //70// 
aße∑akarmanåße vå puna˙ s®∑†ir na yujyate/ 
 
This means: 
 
68. For we have no proof for a dissolution in the form of universal destruction. 
And that activity (karman) on the part of Prajåpati would serve no purpose. 
69. Moreover, it is not possible that beings that have engaged in activity 
(karmavat) would stop without experiencing [the results of] those [activities]; for 
the fruit deriving from one action cannot be stopped by another activity 
(karman). 
70. The coming to a stop of all [beings] without [experiencing] the fruits [of 
their activities] is not possible. And nor is that absence of experience itself the 
fruit of any activity (karman). 
71ab. Alternatively, in case all activities (karman) have been destroyed, no new 
creation is possible. 
 
This passage repeatedly uses the word karman, a notoriously difficult term to translate. 
It means primarily activity, but can also refer to the mechanism that brings about karmic 
retribution. In the case of Vaiße∑ika this means that dharma and adharma, or ad®∑†a, 
might conceivably be referred to by this term. It certainly never refers to the desire of 
God, especially not if, as Pårthasårathi maintains, God's desire interferes with the 
process of karmic retribution. Kumårila's text speaks about cosmic dissolution as an 
                                                
7 ÍlV 5.15.68-71ab. 
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activity, most probably an activity of Prajåpati, and there is no reason whatsoever to 
assume that God's desire played a special role in this event. 
 This impression is confirmed by the fact that God's desire does enter the picture 
in Kumårila's then following account of renewed creation. God's desire is here 
presented, hypothetically, as the cause of karmic retribution, and is indeed contrasted 
with activity. The verses concerned read:8 
 
karmaˆåµ våpy abhivyaktau kiµ nimittaµ tadå bhavet //71// 
¥ßvarecchå yad¥∑yate saiva syål lokakåraˆam/ 
¥ßvarecchåvaßitve hi ni∑phalå karmakalpanå //72// 
na cånimittayå yuktam utpattuµ h¥ßvarecchayå/ 
yad vå tasyå nimittaµ yat tad bhËtånåµ bhavi∑yati //73// 
71cd. Or if [you maintain that] activities manifest themselves [anew at the 
occasion of a new creation], what would cause this? 
72. If you propose God's desire, then let that be the cause of the world. For it 
would be pointless to imagine [the efficacy of] actions (karman) if [the creation 
of the world] is controlled by God's desire. 
73. Moreover, God's desire cannot come into existence without having itself a 
cause; or rather, the cause of that [desire] will be the cause [of the creation of] 
living beings. 
 
God's desire, then, is introduced in the discussion of the creation of the world, but plays 
no role in its dissolution. Kumårila's opponents rather looked upon the destruction of 
the world as due to the activity of Prajåpati. There is nothing typically Vaiße∑ika in this 
part of the discussion. 
 Pårthasårathi, on the other hand, uses this passage as a pretext to ascribe a 
certain position to the Vaiße∑ikas. To understand what is at stake, some general 
reflections are called for. 
 The notion of a creator God had been introduced into Vaiße∑ika (perhaps by 
Praßastapåda) for a special reason. It solved a problem which had occupied the thinkers 
of that school. It answered the question how deeds of living beings can bring about 
situations that punish or reward them. In other words, it helped to understand the 
mechanism of karmic retribution. Earlier Vaiße∑ikas had tried to solve this problem 
differently. They had claimed that deeds and their retributions are linked through the 
intermediary of two qualities of the soul, dharma and adharma. The soul of each living 
creature being omnipresent and eternal, these qualities could be thought of as acting at a 
                                                
8 ÍlV 5.15.71cd-73. 
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distance, and at a moment of time far removed from the deed that had caused them. 
However, foresight and conscious design could not be attributed to these qualities. 
These were rather linked to other qualities of the soul — such as buddhi ‘knowledge’ — 
that are not involved in the mechanism of karmic retribution. How then can these 
unconscious qualities act as if guided by foresight and conscious design? 
 The answer proposed by Praßastapåda is simple. They are guided by foresight 
and conscious design. There is an all-powerful creator God who arranges things in such 
a way that dharma and adharma bring about the desired results. The following passage 
from the Padårthadharmasa∫graha shows this:9 
 
When in this way the four composite elements have come into existence, a great 
egg (mahad aˆ∂am) is formed, caused solely by God's (maheßvara) meditation / 
volition (abhidhyåna), out of atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth.10 
In it [God] creates Brahmå, with four faces like so many lotuses, the grandfather 
of all worlds (sarvalokapitåmahaµ brahmåˆam), and all worlds; he then enjoins 
him with the duty of creating living things. That Brahmå, thus enjoined by God, 
and endowed with abundant knowledge, complete absence of passion and 
absolute power, knows the effects of the deeds of living beings; he 
creates the Prajåpatis, his mind-created (månasa) sons, with knowledge, 
experience and span of life in accordance with their [past] deeds; [he also 
creates] the Manus, Devas, Ù∑is and groups of Pit®s (pit®gaˆa), the four varˆas 
out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet (mukhabåhËrupådata˙) [respectively], 
and the other living beings, high and low (uccåvacåni bhËtåni); he then connects 
them with Dharma, knowledge, absence of passion and power in accordance 
with their residue of past deeds. 
 
Other authors of the Nyåya and Vaiße∑ika schools confirm the importance of this side 
of God's activity. They came to admit that they could not make sense of karmic 
retribution without assuming an omnipotent God supervising the process.11 
                                                
9 WI p. 11, § 59: evaµ samutpanne∑u catur∑u mahåbhËte∑u maheßvarasyåbhidhånamåtråt taijasebhyo 
'ˆubhya˙ pårthivaparamåˆusahitebhyo (variants: pårthivådiparamåˆusahitebhyo, pårthivåˆusahitebhyo) 
mahad aˆ∂am årabhyate (some editions read utpadyate)/ tasmiµß caturvadanakamalaµ 
sarvalokapitåmahaµ (variant: caturvadanakamalasakalalokapitåmahaµ) brahmåˆaµ 
sakalabhuvanasahitam utpådya prajåsarge viniyu∫kte (variant: niyu∫kte)/ sa ca maheßvareˆa viniyukto 
(variant: niyukto) brahmå 'tißayajñånavairågyaißvaryasampanna˙ pråˆinåµ (variant: sarvapråˆinåµ) 
karmavipåkaµ viditvå karmånurËpajñånabhogåyu∑a˙ sutån prajåpat¥n månasån manudevar∑ipit®gaˆån 
(variant: manËn deva°) mukhabåhËrupådataß caturo varˆån anyåni coccåvacåni bhËtåni (variants: bhËtåni 
ca; anyåni coccåvacåni ca s®∑†vå) s®∑†vå, åßayånurËpair dharmajñånavairågyaißvaryai˙ saµyojayat¥ti// 
10 Atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth constitute, in Vaiße∑ika, gold. 
11 See my forthcoming article "Consciousness and teleology in the Indian philosophical tradition". 
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 Unfortunately for the M¥måµsakas this solution was not open to them. They 
were indissolubly linked to the idea that the Veda is without beginning (not uttered by 
God, as the Vaiße∑ikas had it), having been continuously handed down in a world 
which, too, is without beginning, and without periodic destructions and recreations. 
They did however accept the principle of karmic retribution. But unlike the Vaiße∑ikas 
they had to maintain that karmic retribution can work, and can be understood, without 
assuming that it is guided by foresight and conscious design. 
 We now understand why Pårthasårathi, instead of presenting the notion of God 
as a means to explain karmic retribution, depicts it as interfering with it. The period of 
dissolution of the world, in particular, is described as one in which "dharma and 
adharma, not producing an effect because interrupted by the desire of God, remain in 
their respective souls" (dharmådharmåß ca ... ¥ßvarecchåpratibaddhå˙ phalam 
aprayacchantas te∑u te∑v åtmasv avati∑†hante). And the subsequent renewed creation of 
living beings is made possible by the removal of those restraints: "Then many different 
living beings, such as humans, animals, etc., are produced by the various deeds 
(karman) whose potencies have become manifest once the interruptions have 
disappeared due to the power of [God's] desire [to create]" (tatas tadicchåvaßåd 
evåpagatapratibandhair abhivyaktasåmarthyair vividhai˙ karmabhir 
vividhånekanarapaßvådibhedabhinnaµ bhËtajåtam årabhyate). In other words, if only 
God did not interfere, karmic retribution would pursue its normal course, and there 
would be no destruction and new creation of the world. This position is attributed to the 
Vaiße∑ikas. The M¥måµså position is closely related to this: There is no creator God 
who interferes, and karmic retribution does pursue its course, not interrupted by 
destructions and renewed creations of the world. 
 Do we have to conclude that Pårthasårathi made up the position he ascribes to 
the Vaiße∑ikas? The answer must be negative. Jayanta Bha††a's Nyåyamañjar¥ (ca. 900 
C.E.)12 contains some passages that are of interest. First there is a passage that presents 
a view that is rejected by the critic of the idea of a creator God, and which may 
therefore represent Jayanta's own position:13 
 
atha bråhmeˆa månena saµvatsaraßatani∑†håm adhiti∑†hati parame∑†hini 
maheßvarasya saµjih¥r∑å jåyate/ tayå tirohitasvaphalårambhaßakt¥ni karmåˆi 
saµbhavant¥ti saµpadyate sakalabhuvanapralaya˙/ punaß ca tåvaty eva 
råtripråye kåle vyat¥te sis®k∑å bhavati bhagavata˙/ tayå 'bhivyaktaßakt¥ni 
karmåˆi kåryam årabhante iti. 
                                                
12 On the date of Jayanta Bha††a see Hacker, 1951: 162 (112). 
13 NM p. 490/177. 
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Then, when Brahman supervises the conclusion of hundred Brahman-years, a 
desire to destroy arises in the Supreme Lord. On account of that [desire] the 
activities (karman) loose the power to bring about their results, and so the 
dissolution of all worlds comes about. And again, when the same amount of 
time, which is like the night, has passed, a desire to create arises in the Lord. On 
account of that [desire to create] the power of the activities manifests itself, and 
the activities bring about their effect. 
 
Later in the same discussion about God, the Nyåyamañjar¥ refers back to this passage 
and states:14 
 
nanu ca yugapad eva sakalajagatpralayakaraˆam anupapannam, avinåßinåµ 
karmaˆåµ phalopabhogapratibandhåsaµbhavåd iti coditam/ na yuktam etat/ 
¥ßvarecchåpratibaddhånåµ karmaˆåµ stimitaßakt¥nåm avasthånåt/ 
tadicchåpreritåni karmåˆi phalam ådadhati/ tadicchåpratibaddhåni ca 
tatrodåsate/ kasmåd evam iti cet/ acetanånåµ cetanånadhi∑†hitånåµ 
svakåryakaraˆånupalabdhe˙/ 
It has been objected that the simultaneous dissolution of the entire universe is 
not possible, because it is not possible to obstruct the experiences of their results 
of the activities (karman) which are undestructable. This is not correct. Because 
the activities are obstructed by God's desire, and their power [to bring about 
results] is paralysed. Activities that are impelled by His desire bring about 
results, and those that are obstructed by His desire remain inactive. If [you ask] 
why it is like this, [the answer is:] because it has never been observed that 
unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, bring about their 
effects. 
 
The final argument — unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, 
cannot bring about their effects — is not new, as we have seen. To bring about their 
effects, activities have to be guided by a conscious being; in other words, they have to 
be impelled by His desire. This idea may be behind the very introduction of God in the 
Vaiße∑ika system. The present passage expands the idea by adding that God's desire can 
also obstruct activities; this explains the simultaneous destruction of the entire universe. 
But this passage does not say that God only obstructs activities, and that without God's 
interference they would bring about their results just as well. The final remark "it has 
never been observed that unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, 
                                                
14 NM p. 510/186. 
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bring about their effects" proves the opposite. It had to be a M¥måµsaka, viz. 
Pårthasårathi, who turned the argument on its head. For him God interferes with the 
working of karma, and nothing else. 
 
 Not all Vaiße∑ikas looked upon God's role as that of interrupting the process of 
karmic retribution. Praßastapåda, as we have seen, states the opposite. And Udayana's 
Kiraˆåval¥, while commenting Praßastapåda's phrase "when the ad®∑†as have stopped 
their activity" (ad®∑†ånåµ v®ttinirodhe sati), explains:15 pralayahetunåd®∑†ena 
pratibandhe sati "when there is interruption [of the ad®∑†as] on account of the ad®∑†a 
which is the cause of the destruction [of the world]". Ad®∑†a, singular or plural, is 
synonymous with dharma and adharma, the two qualities that are responsible for 
karmic retribution. The destruction of the world itself, according to Udayana, is due to 
dharma and adharma, and not to the interruption of their activity caused by the desire of 
God. 
 But even Pårthasårathi himself describes, in his Íåstrad¥pikå, the Vaiße∑ika 
position in a way which does not differ so blatantly from the texts of that school. (It 
may here be recalled that the Íåstrad¥pikå was composed before the Nyåyaratnåkara.)16 
We read here (p. 115): 
 
na hi pralaye paramåˆËnåµ pralayo 'småkam (i.e., vaiße∑ikånåm) asti 
såµkhyådivat/ kåryadravyåˆi tu dvyaˆukåd¥ni sarvåˆy eveßvarecchayå 
vißli∑†åvayavåni pral¥yante, paramåˆavas tu mitho 'saµyuktås ti∑†hanti 
vyomådayaß ca k∑etrajñåß cåtm¥yadharmådharmayuktå evåvati∑†hante/ sargakåle 
punar ¥ßvarecchåµ k∑etrajñåd®∑†aµ ca nimittam åsådya paramåˆu∑u karmåˆy 
utpadyante tadvaßåc ca mitha˙ saµyuktåß catu∑†aye 'pi paramåˆavo 
dvyaˆukådikrameˆa yathåsvaµ p®thivyådikaµ bhËtacatu∑†ayam årabhante/ 
nimittabhËtak∑etrajñåd®∑†avaicitryåc ca jaråyujåˆ∂ajodbhijjasvedajabhinnaµ 
ßar¥rabhedam ¥ßvarecchåkåritasaµyogaviße∑åt paramåˆava årabhante/ 
For according to us Vaiße∑ikas, unlike the Såµkhyas, atoms do not dissolve in 
the dissolution [of the world]. Composite substances (kåryadravya), on the other 
hand, that is to say all dyads and [larger objects], dissolve, their parts having 
been separated by God's desire; but the atoms, without mutual connection, 
remain, and so do [the omnipresent substances] such as ether, and the souls, the 
latter accompanied each by their own dharma and adharma. At the time of a new 
creation movements arise in the atoms, the cause of which is God's desire as 
                                                
15 Ki p. 62 l. 6-7. 
16 See Ramaswami Sastri, 1937. 
M¥måµså versus Vaiße∑ika  10 
 
 
well as the dharma and adharma (ad®∑†a) of the souls; the four kinds of atoms, 
which by virtue of these [movements] are [now] joined together, form the four 
elements earth etc., each their own, in the sequence which begins with the dyad. 
And on account of the variety of dharma and adharma in the souls, which cause 
[the process], the atoms, because of the special connections brought about by 
God's desire, form a variety of bodies, viz. born from the womb, born from an 
egg, sprouting, and born from perspiration. 
 
* * * 
 
 We can conclude that Pårthasårathi in his Nyåyaratnåkara (but not yet in his 
Íåstrad¥pikå) brings to light a fundamental difference in attitude between M¥måµså and 
Vaiße∑ika with regard to the mechanism of karmic retribution. The Vaiße∑ikas had come 
to admit that this mechanism is hard to explain in non-teleological terms, and without 
assuming a conscious agent in the process. They introduced the notion of a creator God 
in order to avoid this difficulty. The M¥måµså thinkers were basically confronted with 
the same problem, but could not accept the Vaiße∑ika solution without fundamentally 
changing their system. All they could do was ignore the problem, and criticise the 
notion of a creator God on other grounds. This is what Kumårila does. His commentator 
Pårthasårathi goes one step further. He depicts the Vaiße∑ika system as not really 
needing the idea of a creator God. We have seen that in so doing he painted an incorrect 
picture of that system. 
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